








A new start for EU-US relations? 




We will only briefly mention trade in spite of its enormous 
importance for the $5.5 trillion economic relationship. The 
reason is that this an area where the US and the EU are truly 
equal partners and where there is a constant game of give and 
take and negotiation. The arrival to the White House of 
President Biden heralds a promising new period: the 
Commission and its US counterparts have just come to an 
agreement on the removal of Section 232 Steel tariffs and a 
suspension of the EU’s countervailing duties. Concerning 
the Boeing/Airbus dispute, both sides suspended in March 
the tariffs they were allowed to impose after the WTO 
litigation phase. On WTO, a new climate of cooperation 
raises hopes for the future of this vital multilateral 
organization. The EU and the US are also working on a trade 
and health proposal. And the Commission has proposed 
setting up a Trade and Tech Council to discuss in this format 
difficult issues like 5 and 6G, digital taxes, and cloud services. 
VACCINES 
A few days ago, President Biden stunned the world by calling 
for  lifting the patents on Covid-19 vaccines. Lifting the 
patents  has been asked for by an international campaign over 
the last weeks. So the President’s announcement was 
certainly a clever communication initiative. It portrays the 
United States in a favourable light showing care and 
leadership  in the response against Covid 19.  
The question is: should this announcement not have been 
preceded by a minimum of consultation with the European 
allies who have a big stake in this issue?  A measure like lifting 
the patents can have profound effects on this sector and on 
The election of President Biden was greeted by 
sighs of relief across Europe and offered the 
promise of a renewed relationship. The first 
hundred days in the office have been 
impressive. The tone vis-à-vis the EU  has 
changed radically. New perspectives of 
cooperation are opening up, as set out in the 
Commission’s December communication on 
“EU-US: A new transatlantic agenda for global 
change”.  
 
For this to be fruitful two conditions need 
to be met. The first and most important one 
is linked to the capacity of the EU to deliver 
and to do what it takes to be a credible and 
strong partner. In this sense the future of 
the transatlantic partnership depends more 
on the European side than the American 
one. America is a super power and will 
remain one.  And super powers only listen 
to other powers that are serious.  
 
But there is also a need for changes on the 
U.S side. The quiet assumption, so 
prevalent in the U.S, that it is natural for it 
to lead on all major issues and for the 
Europeans to follow will not stand up to the 
requirements of today. A strong partner can 
and will at times have different views and 
even different interests and should be 
allowed to defend them without being 
accused of jeopardizing the relationship.  
 
This policy brief concentrates on this latter 
part and ask a number of questions 
addressed to our American friends. A 
strong relationship can only thrive if we are 
honest with each other and at times frank. 
All too often the European timidity when 
confronted with U.S interlocutors is 
compensated by badmouthing them 








research generally. Is this the right approach? Maybe, but 
there are at least a few issues to be considered before going 
that way. Would this not be a rather theoretical gift to the 
third world in view of the fact that the production of vaccines 
is a highly specialised and sophisticated business? Is there any 
chance that this measure would lead in the short term to the 
much needed scaling up of production capacities? Some 
experts claim that it would take months to negotiate waivers 
for intellectual property rights, which would be 
counterproductive to the necessity of producing and 
distributing vaccines fast. The U.S. firm Moderna already 
voluntarily waived its patent rights in October, but other 
manufacturers still are not able to use its technology without 
active cooperation from Moderna. And drug manufacturers 
argue that imposing the lifting of patents at this measure  
would stifle innovation and possibly lead to the production 
of compromised vaccine with lower quality, which would 
have a rather disruptive effect.  
Isn’t it the case that the main target should be trade barriers? 
It would seem that a more concrete contribution to helping 
less rich countries would be to ensure sufficient sales to them 
at a reasonable price, or even gifts. The US government’s 
proclaimed intention to use 60 million of unused Astra 
Zeneca shots for that purpose is certainly not an adequate 
response here. It is interesting to recall in this context that as 
of 6 May, the EU has distributed about 200 million doses 
within the European Union, and another 200 million doses 
manufactured in the EU were exported (though not to the 
US which has enough production capacities of its own), 
while the U.S.  production amounts to some 320 million 
doses, with hardly any exports so far. The U.S in fact 
introduced an export ban on any exports from US produced 
Covid vaccines for national security reasons in June. It has 
also put curbs on the export of the raw materials needed to 
produce the vaccines.   
Another key measure is support to COVAX. Here, the U.S 
and the EU are the biggest contributors by far. The EU and 
the Member States committed €2.5billion. The United States 
announced a contribution to GAVI specifically and 
COVAX more in general of $4 billion (EUR 3.2 billion) 
divided in two equal tranches over the period 2021-2022. 
The challenge now is to transform this into getting vaccines 
to the countries and need and to their people.  
 CLIMATE CHANGE  
President Biden recently organized a big event about the fight 
against climate change. This is a welcome development. It is 
great that the U.S. have re-joined the Paris Agreement. While 
the return of the US will strengthen the international 
response, it is too early for the US to claim  leadership.  
Ever since the UNFCCC in 1992 it has been the European 
Union which has been the leading proponent of an active 
fight against climate change; we were by far the biggest 
contributor to the obligatory cuts agreed in the KYOTO 
PROTOCOL. The U.S never ratified the agreement and 
hence did not take on any commitments under Kyoto. They 
joined Paris but walked out before President Biden took 
them back in. Are we allowed to ask whether this time the 
commitment is serious and sustainable?  
Let us also have a look at the figures of emissions, both in 
total and per capita. The picture that emerges is interesting. 
The EU has quite drastically reduced its emissions over the 
past years. The U.S has not, and the China has massively 
increased its emissions.  EU emissions were estimated to 
total, in 2019, 6.7 tonnes per capita, with total emission being 
3.3 billion metric tonnes, a significant drop from previous 
years. In 2019, the US per capita emissions totalled 15.52 
metric tonnes while the US’ total emissions reached 5.13 
billion tonnes. In 2019 China’s total emission were 10.17 
billion tonnes, with the per capita number reaching 7.10 
metric tonnes.  
Would it be exaggerated to expect of the U.S that they start 
controlling their emissions and bring per capita emissions 
closer to the EU’s level; after all, the EU is a developed region 
with a developed industry? President Biden has already taken 
some important measures, and the trend is encouraging. But 
we want to see the results over the next years.  
The upcoming COP26 in the UK and a possible EU-US 
“trade and climate” initiative within WTO provide excellent 
opportunities for the EU and the US to jointly exert their 
leadership in this key area. One of the difficult issues between 
them will be possible carbon taxes or mechanisms. Starting 
points are different here, so this will require a lot of 
concertation. The new spirit of cooperation and dialogue 








RELATIONS WITH CHINA  
In December 2020, the Commission concluded the 
negotiations on an important investment deal with China 
(CAI: Comprehensive Agreement on Investment). Its 
objective is to allow for more investments in China and a 
much better balance between the two sides in this area. It is 
also to create a more level-playing field with American 
companies who benefit from the trade agreement “Phase 
one”  the U.S has with China. The latter contains among 
other things a commitment by China to buy 200 billion 
worth of goods from the US, which can be seen as an unfair 
way of taking away trade from other partners like the EU. 
The fact that the Chinese have failed to accomplish this, amid 
the trade wars between China and the Trump 
administration, does not subtract from the truth of the 
statement above.    
Signature of the EU deal was heavily criticized by the 
incoming US administration because of the events on Hong 
Kong and the treatment of the Uighur minority. That is, to 
be fair, a debate we have very much within Europe. The 
ratification of the deal is anything but certain. But is it for the 
U.S administration to tell the Europeans how to structure 
their relations with China? One may wonder whether 
Washington, when negotiating its agreement with the 
Chinese, consulted the EU very much. Both Europeans and 
Americans, together with partners like Canada and Japan, will 
have to work together to target unfair Chinese trade practices. 
The EU is not naïve. It is in the process of quite substantially 
building up its autonomous toolbox allowing it to react to 
unfair trade practices. But the concertation must be a two-
way street. The way to deal with HUAWEI is not the same 
in the US and in EU, and indeed within Europe. As allies we 
should of course have an open debate about that. But 
threatening sanctions or accusing each other of being bad 
partners if we disagree is not the route to common success.  
At a more general level, a world where a reconstituted 
Western block would be locked in a  new Cold war with 
China and possibly  Russia, is  not be a very appealing one. 
The idea that the Russians will never ally themselves to China 
underestimates the depth of Russian resentment against the 
west and Russia’s weakness! Now it may well be that the EU 
adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards China may 
prove to be naïve and misguided, because of the aggressive 
behaviour of China. Were that to happen there is no question 
as to where Europe will stand. But we should not from the 
outset relinquish any hope for a more constructive 
relationship with China.  
IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL 
The new approach towards the Iran nuclear deal is yet 
another instance of President’ Biden’s wisdom and a 
welcome return to reason. It was close U.S-EU cooperation 
that led to the deal being struck in the first place. The rejection 
by the Trump administration of the deal came as a shock to 
the Europeans. The secondary sanctions imposed by 
Washington against European firms that  in all legality were 
trading with Iran after sanctions had been lifted as a result of 
the international agreement left a  an even worse  after-taste. 
On the impact of US secondary sanctions,  the New York 
Times wrote: “On Iran alone, the costs of U.S. secondary 
sanctions have been significant. The French energy giant 
Total abandoned a major investment in Iran as soon as 
President Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran deal and 
reimposed American sanctions on Iran. That cost Total an 
estimated $2 billion, while Siemens lost a rail contract worth 
$1.5 billion and Airbus lost $19 billion.”  
Many of us believe that the weakness this revealed on our 
part because of the pre-dominance of the dollar is something 
that should over time be remedied. The question to our 
American partners is: do they understand that reaction? Do 
they accept that the way to solve issues between the US and 
the EU should not be via sanctions? I say this also in the 
context of Nord Stream 2. This is a very controversial deal 
including within Europe. But that is not the point. The point 
is: is it for the US to decide on such a deal? To punish  
European firms that  have worked on this for many years 
(the projects dates back a long time when relations were not 
what they are today) and to target one of its closest partners, 
Germany? It is for the Europeans to sort out their 
disagreements on this and for the German government to 
draw the conclusions from the debate. Of course, the voice 
of the US is important in this context, because of the 
geopolitical aspects and to some extent  the U.S exports of 










Finally, a word on defence. The US rightly asks the 
Europeans to do more for their own defence; after all, 80% 
of NATO spending comes from allies that are not EU 
members. Things are moving in the right direction: in 2019, 
total European defence spending amounted to 186 billion 
marking a 5% increase from 2018; in 2019 it grew by 2.0% 
in real terms.  
At the same time, the EU as such is moving towards a higher 
commitment on defence issues, with initiatives like structured 
reinforced cooperation or the creation of an European 
Défense Fund. The US is rightly pointing to the need to 
avoid, in Madeleine Albright’s words of 1998, the triple “D”:  
duplicate , de-couple, discriminate (against non-EU NATO 
members). But the tone of US warnings at times is over the 
top, implying that the European efforts could  jeopardize 
NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Both 
aforementioned initiatives are modest ones. Pretending for 
instance that the new EDF would be a  threat to NATO 
is exaggerated. We are talking about a fund totalling EUR 
7.8 billion over 7 years. This is important because for the 
first time the EU accepts that money of the EU budget 
can be used for defence purposes. That is a move that 
should suit Washington. Concerning PESCO, after many 
discussions, the Europeans have agreed to allow for third 
parties’ participation in the program.  
The EU has a lot to offer to our joint defence and could 
be a good vehicle to strengthening NATO, too. The fact 
is that EU-NATO cooperation has vastly improved over 
the years . Maybe the time has actually come to go a step 
further and refine a better division of tasks between the 
two organizations, as argued very cogently in an article 
published at EGMONT by Sven Biscop called “EU-
NATO relations: compass, concept and concordat.” It is 
also time to establish a more direct dialogue between the 
EU and the US. The EU is an organization with a broad 
political and economic agenda that can deal with many 
matters that NATO cannot handle. It is very much in the 
US interest to have the EU invest more in overall security 
and defence. 
CONCLUSION 
Between Allies we need trust and frankness. There are 
questions we should not be afraid of asking. I am sure 
Americans can ask a set of similar questions to the 
Europeans. Some do, like Tony Gardner in his truly 
excellent book called “Stars and Stripes”. That does not 
mean calling into question the transatlantic relationship. 
On the contrary. It means creating a better and more equal 
relationship.  
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